In cross-sector competition cases, the CCCS will establish with the relevant sector regulator the best regulatory authority to deal with the case in accordance with the legal powers assigned to each regulatory authority. (10) Concentration can always fall within the net economic exclusion in the fourth calendar if it turns out that it significantly reduces competition. The adoption of flexible global distribution and pricing strategies, in line with competition rules in Singapore and around the world, will enable product manufacturers to achieve global price stability. The antitrust, competition and trade regulatory group of K-L Gates has experience in developing and implementing coordinated distribution strategies in different regions of the world, including Asia. Being “dominant” or “monopolistic” per se is not illegal. This means, however, that the dominant undertaking must be careful not to violate the section 47 prohibition by engaging in conduct that harms competition or risks harming. 27.4.16 Another possible offset factor would be that the transaction creates efficiency gains that strengthen the post rivalry. B, for example, when a concentration of two small competitors generates efficiency gains that allow it to impose a lower price and compete more effectively with a larger player, so that there is no significant reduction in competition. All of the alleged efficiency gains must be demonstrable, i.e. the parties arguing these efficiency gains must demonstrate that the efficiency gains (i) are clear and supported by detailed and verifiable evidence; (ii) are likely to occur with the merger and within a reasonable time. The alleged efficiency gains must also be specific to the merger, i.e. they are a direct result of the transaction. Savings resulting simply from lower production are not considered efficiency gains.
5. As a general rule, do non-cross-border mergers not result in a significant restriction of competition, unless there is a system of vertical agreements and, if so, what kind of restrictions or vertical provisions of such agreements are generally examined? 27.4.1 Section 54 prohibits mergers that have resulted in a significant exclusion from competition in a Singapore market for goods or services, or that may result in significant exclusion from competition, unless the merger is excluded from the fourth schedule or is exempted by the Minister on the basis of a public interest consideration. A vertical chord is considered benign or beneficial if it can bring benefits by promoting efficiency gains. However, a dominant company must continue to demonstrate that its conduct is proportionate to the benefits it has obtained. 2.11 Are there specific rules for vertical IP agreements and, if so, how do those rules differ?  See Competition Act, Third Schedule Exclusions, Para. 9 (agreements with a net economic benefit include any agreement that ( a) contributes to improved production or distribution or (b) promotes technical or economic progress; Do not impose restrictions on the companies concerned that are not necessary to achieve these objectives, or (ii) allow the companies concerned to eliminate competition with respect to a substantial part of the products or services concerned.) , available here.